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[p.79] Affecting Qualitative Health Psychology 
 
Abstract 
The ‘affective turn’ is a contemporary movement within the humanities, social science 
and psychology to investigate affect, emotion and feeling as hybrid phenomena jointly 
constituted from both biological and social influences. Health and illness are themselves 
jointly constituted in this way, and many of the topics, concerns and methods of health 
psychology are strongly permeated by affective phenomena. Qualitative research in 
health psychology might therefore benefit by engaging with this work. This paper 
describes some features of the affective turn, and suggests theories, terminology and 
methods that might be useful. 
 
Introduction 
Currently, the human and social sciences are witnessing a renewed and growing interest 
in the phenomena indexed by the terms affect, emotion and feeling, and this is occurring 
to such an extent that many are saying that enquiry is undergoing an ‘affective turn’ (e.g. 
Athanasiou, Hantzaroula, & Yannakopoulos, 2008; Clough & Halley, 2007). Because they 
engage directly with important categories of experience these developments are relevant 
to psychology in general, and – since they also embrace aspects of embodiment – to 
health psychology in particular. Psychology has a sorry history with the body, tending 
either to ignore it (cognitive and social psychologies) or treat it as exclusively 
foundational (biological and neuro-psychologies). The affective turn may provide health 
psychologists with ways of thinking and researching that sidestep this unpalatable forced 
choice, allowing them to jointly explore aspects of social and bodily influences upon 
health and illness. Accordingly, in this paper I will sketch some of the contours of this 
turn to affect and summarise its relevance for health psychology. I will then describe 
some of the theoretical, terminological and methodological resources that qualitative 
health psychological research into affective phenomena might deploy. 
 
The Affective Turn 
Scholarship within the affective turn is not homogenous: it is distributed across many 
disciplines, engages with a range of substantive phenomena, and deploys evidence and 
concepts from sources including philosophy, psychoanalysis, psychology, neuroscience 
and emotion studies. But within this heterogeneity there is nevertheless [p.80] a deeper 
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cohesion: a common understanding of affective phenomena as thoroughly hybrid and 
co-constituted. Affect, emotion and feeling are being treated neither as wholly biological 
nor as simple manifestations of language and the social realm. They are instead 
conceptualised, in various ways, as phenomena constituted jointly from social influence 
and biological capacity, and so necessarily hybrid in content, form and process. Whilst 
their occurrence is enabled by, and gains some of its character from, biology, it is 
simultaneously both interpellated (‘called out’) and co-constituted by influences operating 
through social relations, language and social practice. 
 
Historically, analyses of the affective realm are not new; what is currently distinctive is 
the co-occurring acceleration of interest across disciplines including geography, literature, 
anthropology, social theory, criminology, sociology, psychology. Whilst not all of the 
scholars discussed here would explicitly describe themselves as participating in this 
emergent movement, all are distinctive both for their emphasis upon the affective and 
for neither reducing it to biology nor simply treating it as epiphenomenal to sociality. 
Indeed, there is a clear sense in which the affective turn both follows from and extends 
the linguistic turn that has characterised much qualitative research in health psychology 
(and elsewhere) in recent years (Greco & Stenner, 2008). Rather than marking a break 
with or dismissal of the linguistic turn, the turn to affect is in many ways a continuation 
of it, because it is similarly characterised by a striving to better grasp the complexities of 
experience by not treating our ‘inner’ lives as a pure, unsullied, transcendent realm. Like 
the linguistic turn that preceded it, scholarship within the affective turn treats experience 
as something to be explained, rather than as explanation (Middleton & Brown, 2005; 
Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2007); it understands subjectivity as emergent from and 
immanent within the flows of language and embodied social practice (Blackman, 
Cromby, Hook, Papadopoulos, & Walkerdine, 2008), rather than treating it as pure origin 
and source. 
 
Reflecting both its substantive diversity and the ways in which it permeates multiple 
disciplines, scholarship associated with the affective turn is heterogeneous and dispersed: 
for example, there have recently been journal special issues dealing with affect in 
disciplines including literature (Athanasiou et al., 2008), social theory and cultural studies 
(Blackman & Venn, 2010) and psychology (Blackman & Cromby, 2007). Within these 
writings, however, common tropes (bodies, hybridity, co-constitution, circulation, flow, 
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contagion, suffusion, attunement) and related points of reference frequently recur. One 
source is Sedgewick (2003), whose psychologically-informed analyses include discussion 
of various emotions, most prominently shame; another is Brennan (2004), whose 
psychoanalytic account of affect transmission is supplemented with a materialist 
explanation grounded in the (putative) activity of human pheromones. However, not all 
accounts are psychological or psychoanalytic: some are informed by affective 
neuroscience (e.g. Damasio, 1999; Panksepp, 1998) or Deleuzian philosophy (Massumi, 
1995; Thrift, 2007). Some affective research has an applied focus: in criminology, for 
example, there have been studies of the passions and sensuous pleasures of offending, 
using ethnography to explore how the marginalised reclaim space and mark identity 
through practices such as graffiti (Ferrell, 2003). Additionally, in presenting their work 
scholars in the affective turn sometimes adopt distinctive strategies: for example, Clough 
(2010) – another author very widely cited - provides an analysis of trauma that uses [p.81] 
photographs and poetry to evoke in her readers something of the affects she wishes to 
implicate. 
 
The affective turn is of immediate, far-reaching relevance to health psychology because it 
attempts to include within analysis ways of experiencing, knowing and relating that are 
enabled by our character as embodied creatures, as well as – simultaneously with – our 
character as speaking beings. Health psychology is centrally defined by its relation to 
bodily experience, such that health and illness are sensible only as aspects of what it is to 
be embodied. There is also a deeper parallel with the affective turn because health and 
illness are themselves hybrid, co-constituted phenomena (Lyons & Chamberlain, 2006). 
There is a stark affective dimension to our responses to illness and mortality, within 
which both our own experiences and those of our loved ones come to figure in ways that 
are inescapably and often profoundly emotional. Indeed, affectivity so thoroughly 
permeates health psychology that emotion has been proposed as central to our 
understandings of the body, health and illness (Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987). 
 
For example, the embodied feelings associated with symptoms are defining features of 
both illness and health, and their occurrence and recognition are thoroughly bound up 
with other feelings, categorised as affective or emotional (Costa & McCrae, 1987; Watson 
& Pennebaker, 1989). Bendelow’s (2009) extended discussion particularly links emotion 
to medically unexplained symptoms, and to experiences characterised (reductively - 
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Newton, 2003) as ‘stress’.  Similarly, studies of the difficulties, dilemmas and practices of 
medical professionals breaking bad news to patients display a constant concern with 
emotionality (Ptacek & Eberhardt, 1996). There is also a profoundly affective dimension 
to problems of (so-called) psychopathology, with various recent analyses foregrounding 
the interplay of emotion and feeling as constitutive influences within the experiences 
associated with psychiatric diagnoses of eating disorders, depression, anxiety disorder and 
paranoid schizophrenia (Cromby, 2004; Cromby & Harper, 2009; Meyer, Waller, & 
Waters, 1998). Since emotions and feelings are thoroughly bound up with moral 
reasoning (Haidt, 2003) affective research also has potential to illuminate studies of 
medical ethics and decision making. Health psychology frequently addresses the 
implications and health consequences of everyday activities and behaviours, and 
interventions frequently enrol lifestyle advice (e.g. Jarvis & Wardle, 2006; Lynch, Kaplan, 
& Salonen, 1997; Nutbeam, 2000); and everyday life is thoroughly permeated by 
emotions and feelings (Scherer, Wranik, Sangsue, Tran, & Scherer, 2004). Discussions of 
concordance with treatment similarly implicate both emotions and feelings: 
physiotherapeutic regimes frequently interpellate feelings of boredom and fatigue, whilst 
pharmaceutical regimes may evoke unpleasant feelings associated with the undesired 
effects of medication; additionally, many interventions enrol emotional responses 
powerfully constitutive of new and perhaps highly visible subject positions as disabled or 
ill (Hagger & Orbell, 2006). Studies of the affective may also illuminate aspects of 
complementary and alternative medicine, which are often said to provide feelings of 
control (Boon et al., 2000), emotional support (Paltiel et al., 2001) and wellbeing (Sointu, 
2006). Finally, of course, it is well-established that emotionality is closely bound up with 
both the experience and the management of pain (Bullington, 2009; Rhudy, Williams, 
McCabe, Rambo, & Russell, 2006), and pain - itself a feeling - is a prominent component 
of many experiences of illness.[p.82] 
 
In such ways, the terrain of health psychology is consistently suffused by various kinds of 
emotions and feelings; their investigation might therefore yield benefits. Efforts to do so 
will nevertheless encounter difficulties, the first of which are likely to be definitional. The 
diversity of scholarship within the affective turn is such that there are multiple definitions 
of even the basic terms affect, emotion and feeling. The three terms are frequently used 
all-but interchangeably, but alternately are also mobilised in ways that signal ontological 
differences and/or theoretical allegiances; this confusion is then frequently magnified by 
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disciplinary preferences and traditions (6, Squire, Treacher, & Radstone, 2007). Affect in 
Deleuzian philosophy is an intensity that flows within and between organisms, a force 
for becoming (the constant process of change that characterises life itself); affect is thus 
not so much something personally experienced as something pre-personal that 
constitutes experience. Alternately, in many variants of psychoanalysis affect refers to 
primary process activity that occurs outwith consciousness and can only ever (if at all) be 
known within it indirectly. However in neuroscience, many areas of psychology, and 
sometimes in psychoanalysis, too, affect is used all-but interchangeably with emotion. 
Psychology also frequently uses feeling as a synonym for both affect and emotion, 
although in common with other disciplines it frequently reserves this term to index 
phenomenological experiences. Indeed, whilst feeling is often used to index experiences 
of affect or emotion, even here there is variation: Damasio (1999) for example, 
distinguishes between ‘feeling’ as a neural and physiological state of the body-brain 
system, and ‘a state of feeling made conscious’ as an experience. 
 
These are longstanding, widely-recognised problems: the difficulty of defining emotion 
has been much discussed (Griffiths, 1998) and some emotion scholars bemoan the lack 
of universally agreed definitions and taxonomies (J. Turner, 2000). Others suggest this is 
an inevitable consequence of the powerful cultural binding of emotion, implying that the 
hybrid, co-constituted character of affective phenomena inevitably means that a stable 
definition and universal taxonomy are unlikely ever to be achieved (Ratner, 2000). 
Blackman & Venn (2010) propose that, rather than become distracted by definitions we 
should adopt a “more cautious” approach and consider what different conceptualisations 
of the affective might afford or do. This suggestion is appropriate to a moment when 
affect studies are still crystallising as a distinctive sphere of interest, although of course it 
is precisely because of their differential affordances and consequences that definitions will 
ultimately come to matter. Although health psychologists will need to adopt sensible 
definitions of affect, emotion and feeling in order to warrant empirical investigations, 
there is – for the moment, at least - space to choose which to invoke. 
 
Whilst definitional problems are relevant to all empirical research, qualitative 
investigations of embodied, affective phenomena encounter a further difficulty because 
in practice most qualitative analysis presumes a linguistic epistemology. Within this kind 
of constructionist epistemology language is treated as effectively constituting or standing 
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for reality (Gergen, 1997) and meaning is therefore representational in character. The 
patterns of language - identified as themes, discourses, positions, conversational devices 
or narratives – are understood to manage and represent concerns and interests in 
participants’ lives, and their analysis as discursive, representational forms is treated as 
largely sufficient. There have always been some honourable exceptions to this trend: 
Shotter (e.g. 1993) has long argued that alongside what is spoken we must always also 
consider our embodied sense of [p.83] how a conversation is going, whilst Sparkes (2007) 
uses narrative with the explicit aim of generating embodied responses in readers. 
Moreover, the exclusivity once granted to language now seems to be dissipating and even 
some of its most determined advocates are also considering other aspects of our sociality 
(Gergen, 2009). Nevertheless, in psychology it still seems accurate to say that it is “the 
understanding of linguistic meaning within textual material” (Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 
2000, p.1) with which qualitative research is most frequently concerned 
 
A linguistic epistemology will not suffice for research into affective phenomena, firstly 
because the meanings, interests and concerns they bear are not representational in 
character. Feelings of anger, for example, don’t stand for something: rather, those feelings 
are part of the situation within which they arise: they don’t represent (some aspect of) it, 
instead they co-constitute it: affect, feeling and emotion are a-representational. They are 
not devoid of meaning – far from it – but their meanings are immediate, arising in and of 
the lived moment and sensible only as elements within whatever is occurring. Their 
meanings derive less from what they signify or represent than from what they do: the 
particular ways in which they permeate, suffuse and are enfolded by aspects of the 
situation within which they arise. 
 
Secondly, a linguistic epistemology will not suffice because affective phenomena consist 
of textures, intensities, directions, desires and valences that are known corporeally before 
they are identifiable linguistically. We can reflect upon or talk about them, but our 
reflections and descriptions are already at one remove from their occurrence. Because 
they are embodied, affective phenomena are always somewhat ineffable: they have a 
quite literally unspeakable aspect that renders them elusive to, and always slightly 
disjunctive with, language. The body’s ineffability has long been remarked upon by 
philosophers, and by scholars in body studies (Shilling, 2003; Stam, 1998; B. Turner, 
1984) and the affective turn simply presents one version of this enduring difficulty: 
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consequently, it is something to be managed rather than resolved. We must mobilise 
conceptual, terminological and empirical strategies to handle the gap between what we 
can represent of embodied experience and what we already know of it, directly, in the 
immediacy of its living: but we should not imagine that the gap can simply be closed. 
Below, I will offer strategies to support such investigations: first considering theories and 
concepts, then terminology, and finally methods. 
 
Theories and Concepts 
Embodied meaning 
As we have seen, qualitative research typically presumes a linguistic epistemology within 
which the forms, processes and categories of language all-but exhaust what can sensibly 
be interrogated as contributing to meaning. This stance – a basic presumption of the 
‘turn to language’ – has generated much valuable scholarship and afforded many insights 
into the experiential and social aspects of health and illness. Its strengths are so great that 
it sometimes difficult to see how its (implicit) requirement to translate embodied states 
and influences into categories of and moments within language also obscures some aspects 
of experience. Affective qualitative health research requires an epistemological stance 
that can allow these embodied phenomena to become meaningful in their own right, 
rather than only by [p.84] refraction through the linguistic. An epistemology that might 
facilitate this is provided by Ruthrof (1997), who begins with accounts of meaning that 
locate its emergence within language (and, indeed, other symbol systems). He accepts the 
significance of language, and understands that differences between signs (rather than 
their intrinsic features) are the basis of their meaning. He also endorses poststructuralist 
enquiry showing how these differences are bound up with processes of cultural and 
historical change, recognising that the meaning of a sign is always dependent on (other, 
unarticulated) networks of difference, and hence always deferred. Rather than challenge 
this account – versions of which will be familiar to qualitative health researchers from 
writings on social constructionism – Ruthrof seeks to supplement and extend it. He does 
so with the deceptively simple proposition that embodied experience can itself be treated 
as a continuous flux of signs. 
 
Simply put, Ruthrof notes that all of our experience, always, is embodied experience. Like 
philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty (2002) and Sheets-Johnstone (1999) he recognises 
that the body continuously contributes to how we understand and engage with the world, 
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that its sensations and affordances are always a part of how the world appears for us. But 
rather than treat the body as either object or subject, or even chiasmically (in Merleau-
Ponty’s terms) as both, Ruthrof proposes that this continuous contribution to experience 
can itself be treated as a flow of co-occurring somatic signs. These signs are generated by 
multiple embodied systems which are (for example) thermal, gustatory, kinaesthetic or 
haptic in character. Ruthrof argues that the continuously embodied character of 
experience means that the linguistic signs with which qualitative health research more 
usually engages are always and already bound up with and suffused by these other, embodied 
signs, which we know as sensations or feelings. The signs of language are never separate 
from the signs of the body: what we speak and what we hear is always influenced by how 
we feel, and vice-versa: meaningful signs arise directly through and within the body, as 
well as through and in language. 
 
Importantly, Ruthrof is clear that these embodied signs are not meaningful in isolation: 
because they are corporeal, sensual and a-representational, their meaning always has to be 
interpreted alongside other (typically linguistic) signs: their meaning is consequently not 
a-social, but neither is it simply a matter of social convention.  A feeling of anxiety, for 
example, is already meaningful, but we also necessarily interpret this feeling – 
immediately, in the lived moment when it arises - to render its meaning thoroughly 
sensible: we have forgotten something important, we don’t like how someone is speaking 
to us, we have realised that a situation is going to be unpleasant or painful, we are 
mistaking a bodily sensation (e.g. hunger or trapped wind) for an emotional state, we are 
going to be late, we are getting ill, and so on. A feeling of anxiety is a meaningful sign, 
but its meaning needs to be worked up alongside the meanings of other, co-occurring 
signs, if we are to act upon it appropriately (and even then, of course, our interpretations 
may subsequently be revised). 
 
Equally importantly, Ruthrof is also clear that embodied signs are not meaningful only 
because of their interpretation through other sign systems: he rejects the cognitivist claim 
that feelings and sensations depend solely on context for their meaning. This claim is 
often fallaciously supported with reference to Schacter & Singer (1962), even though 
their classic experiment demonstrates only that [p.85] chemically-induced bodily arousal 
magnifies the affective responses generated by different kinds of social interaction, and 
that reports of this effect are modulated by knowledge about its causes. Rather than 
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imagining that embodied signs are entirely meaningless without subsequent 
interpretation, Ruthrof argues that they provide corporeal textures, intensities, valences 
and affordances that resist some interpretations and promote others: a feeling of anxiety, 
for example, is not a feeling of joy, and nor is it a feeling of pain, sexual pleasure, thirst, 
love, nausea, fatigue or satisfaction. 
 
In this way, Ruthrof shows that meaning is never solely linguistic. All of our experiences 
of the signs of language are already suffused with experiences of embodied signs, so that 
the two always come together. Meaning is therefore fundamentally both intersemiotic - 
constituted from the convergence of two or more sign systems - and heterosemiotic, or 
heteregenous in character. Ruthrof’s treatment of bodily experience as signs allows these 
phenomena to signify more fully as bodily signs, providing qualitative health researchers 
with an epistemological stance that includes embodied and affective phenomena equally 
alongside those of language. 
 
 
Embodied language 
Another conceptual resource is to be found in accounts of language that break down its 
distinct separation from the body, affect and feeling. Whilst there is a clear sense in 
which language is embodied when it is both spoken and heard, such accounts provide a 
more profound sense of its embodiment whilst also narrowing the gap between language 
and affect. Vygotsky’s (1962) description of the acquisition of ‘inner speech’, the un-
verbalised commentary on our own and others’ activities that strongly characterises 
thought, is exemplary (though see also Billig, 1987). Vygotsky proposed that there are 
two lines of development in humans, one biological and the other social, and these two 
lines come together to produce thought. The biological line of development is a 
maturational one, whereas the social line of development describes how inner speech has 
its origins in the conversations and relations to which we are exposed. Rather than arising 
mysteriously or spontaneously, inner speech in fact consists of truncated, ‘ring-fenced’ 
fragments of prior conversation that have been stripped free of their original context and 
indexicals, and which we now use to guide our actions. Vygotsky argued that when 
children (and adults) talk aloud to themselves – the ‘egocentric’ speech largely dismissed 
by Piaget as the product of an unsufficiently developed sense of social norms – this 
talking is evidence of these processes of acquisition and transformation. Elements of 
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previous conversations are being taken up and converted into unspoken commentaries, 
and the rehearsal of these fragments aloud to oneself is a moment within these processes 
of acquisition and transformation. 
 
So thought itself is partially constituted by language, which is therefore profoundly 
embodied. But Vygotsky was simultaneously clear that inner speech is only one aspect of 
thought; language “completes” thought, and the element that language completes is 
affective in character: “Thought itself is engendered by motivation, i.e. by our desires and 
needs, our interests and emotions. Behind every thought there is an affective-volitional 
tendency, which holds the answer to the last ‘why’ in the analysis of thinking.” (Vygotsky 
1962, p.150). Not only is language [p.86] profoundly embodied in the form of inner 
speech; inner speech itself is in constant interchange with elements of thought that are 
fundamentally affective. 
 
In Vygotsky’s account these two elements are held relatively distinct in a dualistic 
manner: social influence is confined largely to the line of development from conversation 
and interaction, and the affective is treated – by omission, if not assertion – as biological. 
This dualistic aspect of Vygotsky’s analysis is widely recognised (van der Veer & Valsiner, 
1991) and I have argued elsewhere (Cromby, 2007) that it is unnecessarily limited because 
the embodied feelings that Vygotsky’s account presupposes to constitute the remainder 
of thought are also themselves socialised. Feelings of all kinds are experienced and 
expressed in accord with acquired norms of using, holding and relating to the body, and 
in alignment with locally-obtaining ‘rules’ governing when, where and how emotions 
should be enacted, how hunger should be sated, how pain should be managed, how 
desires should be satisfied, how fatigue, misery, happiness, health and illness should be 
enacted, and so on. These normative corporeal injunctions are aligned with sociocultural 
assignations of (for example) gender and class (Bourdieu 1977, Young, 1990), stamped 
with the mores of their time and place, and overlaid and mediated by strictures and 
expectations communicated by parents, teachers and significant others. Thought, then, 
consists of (at least) two embodied and socialised streams: one of language, and one of 
affect and feeling. Moreover, the gap between these is constantly crossed by 
transformations that convert elements of inner speech into structures and habits of 
feeling; and, conversely, by experiences of feeling where we only subsequently seize upon 
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the correct words with which to ‘fix’ and represent the felt experience, both to ourselves 
and to others. 
 
So language is profoundly embodied as an element of thought, where it operates in 
continuous exchange and interpenetration with affect and feeling. Although this might 
seem to leave its disembodiment into books, papers and other documents intact, this 
apparent disembodiment is in fact superficial. Whilst it is obviously true that written 
words are not words in the mouths of speakers, unless these words are actually read they 
remain mere marks on pieces of paper: and in their reading, something interesting 
happens. Reading is a trivially embodied activity: it requires a brain to co-ordinate activity 
and process information, eyes to see, hands to hold the book, fingers to turn the page 
etc. But it is also profoundly embodied, in the sense that our activity of engaging with and 
understanding the text necessarily mobilises embodied sensations, affects and feelings. 
Johnson (2007) argues that even the most seemingly abstract words such as if, and, but or 
why are in fact indices of embodied processes of meaning-making. Following Gendlin 
(1997) and William James (1892), he suggests that these apparently entirely logical or 
rational words - seemingly content free, devoid of feeling, and meaningful only in the 
context of a logical sequence - are in fact markers of the sensori-motor activity within 
which all of our reasoning is rooted. The word ‘but’, for example, indexes and calls out a 
felt sense of obstruction to the otherwise smooth flow of a narrative or argument, an 
embodied sense of disjunction or blockage, a feeling of impediment or restraint. Johnson 
argues that other fleeting and vague embodied feelings – for example of connection, 
association or direction – similarly find their echo in language, and that they enable even 
the most seemingly disembodied, ‘rational’ processes of reading and thinking.[p.87] 
 
Embodied process 
Another conceptual resource that might inform qualitative analysis of affective 
phenomena is provided by discussions of the ontological character of affects and feelings 
that emphasise their location within what (Ginsburg & Harrington, 1996) call ‘situated 
lines of action’. Feelings and affects are purposive, dynamic, moving and, in Deleuzian 
terms, constitutive of becoming and change. We are always in process, always 
anticipating, always intending (even if we intend to stay still, do nothing). These 
anticipations and intentions are not only part of how we understand and interpret our 
own affectivity, they are constituent elements of how, from moment to moment, it gets 
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configured and produced. Too often in psychology the dominance of experimentalism 
means that this wider realm of process, intentionality and purpose gets bracketed off as 
context, as if there actually were an ontologically separable individual whose appearance 
and activities - after the (quasi) removal of these vital constituents of human life - would 
somehow be both sensible, generalisable and of interest. In this pseudo-scientific logic, 
we find the imaginal truth of persons by pretending to strip away their societal aspects, 
synthetically constraining the social relations of the present moment and artificially 
restricting the information, choices and decisions by which participant preferences 
(actually, moments within socially embedded, embodied, personal-social histories) are 
produced. Consequently, preferences deemed irrelevant to the experiment at hand get 
refigured as ‘individual differences’ or ‘error variation’ and then either averaged out, or 
ignored: thus, as Tolman (1994) puts it, within this logic subjectivity becomes a problem, 
not a resource. 
 
This approach, which institutes what Tolman (following Holzkamp) calls “a covert 
anthropology of the isolated, abstract individual” is common within mainstream emotion 
studies, which are often quantitative and experimental. Qualitative research in health 
psychology is already a reaction against this kind of approach, and with respect to the 
affective turn might therefore be located within the relational process ontology posited 
by Brown & Stenner (2009). Within this ontology, becoming and process are prioritised 
over endurance and stability, and it is continual human activity that itself brings meaning 
to an ever-changing world. Objects, entities, identities and events are as thoroughly in 
flux as language itself, albeit that they change and move at different speeds, variable rates 
of acceleration. Indeed, on the human scale some aspects change so slowly and subtly 
that they appear all-but fixed and can be treated as such analytically: this might apply to 
Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of habitus and its production of enduring, classed modes of 
embodiment, and similarly to Young’s (1990) analysis of gendered styles of bodily 
comportment. A relational process ontology thus potentially embraces (relative) stability 
as well as change, whilst approaching both in a way that foregrounds their always 
mediated character: both the habitus (a ‘structured structuring structure’) and Young’s 
gendered comportments are reproduced through and with objects, relations, discourses 
and practices. Thus, affects, emotions and feelings can be treated as elements of 
embodied process that feed into and through social interaction, chaining back to prior 
moments and feeding forward to constitute future opportunities. This yields an approach 
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to qualitative enquiry compatible with the recognition that any instance of discourse is 
always simultaneously the product of prior communication and the origin of subsequent 
activity; that it necessarily presupposes shared [p.88] perception, shared knowledge, and 
shared evaluation; and that it is always suffused with affect (Brown & Stenner 2009, p.62-
85; p.109-132). 
 
 
Terminology 
It has already been noted that definitional questions loom large within the affective turn; 
moreover, there is an intrinsic paradox in using words to index phenomena that are 
ontologically a-representational, processual, more fluid than the apparent precision of 
textuality seems to imply. Nevertheless, we can and do talk about affective phenomena, 
and if we are to research them we must adopt an appropriate terminology. Whilst both 
lay and academic psychologies offer relevant resources, there are some terms which are 
unhelpful. For example, a distinction frequently made in psychology is that between basic 
and secondary emotions. Basic emotions are said to be hardwired, encapsulated 
responses, universal to our species and capable of cultural modification only through the 
addition of display rules that delineate their culturally normative enactment (Ekman, 
1992). Secondary emotions, by contrast, are culture specific and hence supposedly more 
thoroughly social. Leaving aside the various controversies surrounding notions of basic 
emotion – which include multiple disagreements about their number and character, 
empirical problems concerning their occurrence, and anthropological concerns regarding 
their status (Ortony & Turner, 1990, Wierzbicka, 1999) - this distinction is unhelpful 
because it artificially limits the sociality of some affects. Similarly, psychology sometimes 
designates affective responses such as shame and embarrassment as ‘social emotions’ – 
with the corresponding implication that other emotions, by contrast, are somehow less 
social. Such terminology pre-emptively limits the reach of social influence, working 
against the drive toward hybridity and co-constitution that characterises scholarship 
within the affective turn. Affective qualitative analyses will benefit from eschewing 
terminology that imports a priori settlements of the relationship between biological and 
social influence, instead working upon the uncertain terrain of ordinary life where the 
multiple significances of their continuous fluctuating and mutual interpenetrations 
become visible. 
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Elsewhere (Cromby, 2007) I have proposed that analyses of affective phenomena might 
work with feelings rather than emotions or affects, since unlike the other two terms 
feelings are linguistic primes, universal to all cultures and languages (Shweder, 2004). 
Taking feelings as an analytic focus sidesteps controversies around definitions of 
emotion and affect, places a psychologically-appropriate emphasis on experience, 
foregrounds actual instances of affectivity within which the biological and the social are 
already bound together, may avoid the erroneous universalisation of local or culture-
specific terms, and - with particular respect to language and terminology - yields a ready-
made palette of appropriate phrases and metaphors. These terms nevertheless need to be 
used with some rigour; one way of beginning to provide this is to analytically demarcate 
feelings as falling into three categories (for a more detailed exposition of these categories 
see Cromby, 2007): 
 
Emotional feelings 
Emotions are complex phenomena that implicate narrative, intentionality, appraisal, 
morality and identity, but all typically include a marked somatic or corporeal [p.89] 
component and this is what is meant by emotional feelings: the clenched gut of fear, the 
heavy body of sadness, the burning face of shame, and so on. Emotions have been 
implicated in the etiology of coronary heart and cardio-vascular disease (Everson-Rose & 
Lewis, 2005; Ruiz, Hutchinson, & Terrill, 2008), shown to impact on the workings of the 
immune system (Kiecolt-Glaser, McGuire, Robles, & Glaser, 2002) and to modulate 
multiple pathways and dynamics relevant to disease and ill-health (Miller, Chen, & Cole, 
2009). 
 
Extra-emotional feelings 
The various embodied intensities, textures and sensations associated with urges such as 
hunger and thirst, states such as fatigue or illness, and experiences such as pain, being 
tickled or being caressed. Typically treated dismissively within the mainstream of 
psychology as mere sensation and thoroughly subordinated to cognition, these feelings 
are permeated by emotion but not reducible to it. These feelings are important here 
because they influence almost all health-related decisions: what, when and how much to 
eat and drink, whether and how much to smoke, exercise, rest, and so on; as we have 
seen, they are also constitutive of many symptoms, and implicated in treatment choice 
and concordance. 
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 Feelings of knowing 
These are the many fleeting, subtle and vague feelings whose embodied location and 
character are typically difficult to convey except in terms of their relational and epistemic 
significance: hence we talk of feeling uncomfortable, powerless, suspicious, content and 
so on. In everyday interaction these feelings are characterised in English as ‘gut’ feelings 
or intuition, and they have been theorised by (Damasio, 1994) as ‘somatic markers’ and 
associated by (Johnson, 2007) with ‘logical’ terms such as ‘and’ or ‘but’. As components 
of ‘joint action’ they are integral to all relations and interactions (Shotter, 1993), including 
interactions between doctors and patients (which may themselves have health 
consequences - Adler, 2002). Much work within the emergent medical humanities (e.g. 
Kirklin, 2010) might be understood as attempting to inculcate alternate, less instrumental, 
feelings of knowing amongst medical professionals. 
 
There are rich languages associated with each of these classes of feeling. Words, phrases 
and metaphors that attempt to portray the somatic components of emotion appear in the 
scholarship of emotion studies; as synonyms in good dictionaries and thesauri; in cross-
cultural psychological work on emotion, and in literature and fiction. Similar resources 
may also be used to develop the extant language of extra-emotional feelings, augmented 
in some cases (e.g. pain and other symptom-like responses) with findings from 
appropriate medical literature. There is also already a copious language of feelings of 
knowing, some of which permeates psychology (e.g. feelings of threat, humiliation, 
empowerment, ‘tip of the tongue’ experiences) and some with more specific 
connotations: as we have seen, (Johnson, 2007) proposes that the epistemic aspects of 
these feelings might be captured using terms such as connection, obstruction, 
dissociation, direction and necessity, terms signifying the intentional quality they 
enact.[p.90] 
 
Because affective phenomena are processual, affective qualitative analyses might also 
benefit from a language that captures something of their temporality: rather than simply 
nominating their character and origins, analysts might also wish to identify their temporal 
style. It is not just significant that someone feels, say, angry, nor that their anger is 
expressed openly and confrontationally rather than in a tight-lipped fashion. Analysts 
might also wish to explore how feelings of anger are orchestrated over time, to study the 
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affective rhythms, exchanges and flows that pass within and between participants, to 
examine the extent to which the affects of one person are synchronised, attuned with or 
reactive to those of another (cf. Lewis, 1971). A terminology that might facilitate this 
kind of analysis appears in Stern (1985) who identifies what he calls vitality affects, 
dynamic, kinetic qualities of feeling distinguishable from what he calls the ‘categorical’ 
Darwinian affects of anger, joy, sadness etc. Stern describes vitality affects as 
“inextricably involved with all the vital processes of life, such as breathing, getting 
hungry, eliminating, falling asleep and emerging out of sleep, or feeling the comings and 
goings of emotions and thoughts” (p.54). He suggests that these qualities can be captured 
using terms such as surging, fading away, fleeting, explosive, crescendo, decrescendo, bursting and 
drawn-out. Qualitative analysts might borrow this terminology of temporal change and 
movement to characterise how affects and feelings are temporally enacted. 
 
Methodological procedures 
Here I will briefly describe three methodological strategies that qualitative health 
researchers might usefully deploy in investigation of affective phenomena: multi-modal 
analyses, mixed methods, and affective-textual analysis. 
 
Multi-modal analyses 
By ‘multi-modal’ I mean analyses using data derived from sources other than language 
alone. One the one hand this means that they might in principle work with any of the 
human senses (vision, touch, taste, smell etc.); on the other it means that they might 
explore meanings associated with specific places or objects (a hospital ward, a hospice, a 
child’s first tooth, a once-vital splint)1. Compared to recordings and transcripts of 
interviews and focus groups such data is potentially fuller, richer, more nuanced and 
complex, whilst also being quite literally more situated, more ‘concrete’ and specific; 
consequently, it may have particular potential for the exploration of affect. One example 
of this is the use of photographs and drawings, and such analyses are already established 
both in health psychology (Oliffe & Bottorff, 2007; Radley & Taylor, 2003a), and in the 
investigation of embodied experience more generally (Gillies et al., 2005). They are 
especially suited to the investigation of affective phenomena since “the way in which we 
live feelings and experiences are not always available to verbal description” (Reavey & 
Johnson, 2008 p.299). Images are described in health psychology as facilitating the 
“feeling again” of experiences (Radley & Taylor, 2003b) and have potential to evoke – 
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for both researchers and participants – felt understandings difficult to convey using 
words alone. Data consisting of both participant generated images and discussion of or 
talk about them are more thoroughly liberated from researcher-designed prompts, and 
their combined semiotic-discursive analysis has the potential to generate richer, more 
[p.91] detailed and nuanced accounts of the affective and felt aspects of health and 
illness. Similar advantages are likely to accrue to analyses that work along other sensory 
channels or mobilise significant places and treasured objects. 
 
Mixed methods 
Supplementing qualitative analyses with quantitative data is another way to include bodily 
and affective influence, and numerous possibilities are available. Most simply, rating 
scales can be used to generate crude indices of emotionality with which to characterise 
groups or identify individuals for more intensive qualitative analysis. Q-sorts offer a more 
sophisticated approach, yielding hierarchies of qualitative statements; they are well 
established in health psychology and have been used to study emotion and feeling 
(Stenner & Stainton-Rogers, 2004). Mixed methods have also been used in health 
psychology in the analysis of personal projects (Vroman, Chamberlain, & Warner, 2009), 
and in medical humanities in combination with images (Aita, Lydiatt & Gilbert, 2010). 
Qualitative methods can also be conjoined with quantitative indices of bodily activity 
(galvanic skin response, heart rate, blood pressure etc.). Rather than treating these 
physiological measures as foundational, averaging them across groups, or conceptualising 
them as ‘stress’, they are instead used to explore how bodily activity is already bound up 
with the flows of social interaction. Lyons & Cromby (2010) show how four different 
qualitative analytic techniques can be used alongside blood pressure data to explore the 
conjoined embodied-social activity of participants in conversation. 
 
Affective-textual analysis 
Affective-textual (AT) analysis borrows strategies and procedures from established 
qualitative methods for analysing talk and text, but adopts a process (rather than 
linguistic) ontology: affects, feelings and language are understood as already mutually 
interpenetrated and chained meaningfully together in social interaction. Cromby, Brown, 
Gross, Locke, & Patterson (2010) conducted an AT analysis of the talk of community 
groups, using techniques borrowed from conversation analysis and discursive psychology 
to show how various affects (anger, wonder, disgust) helped to deploy moral categories, 
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construct moral hierarchies, and enrol vulnerable groups within moral arguments. AT 
could complement many aspects of health psychology, including analyses of doctor-
patient communication (Seymour-Smith, Wetherell, & Phoenix, 2002), medical ethics and 
decision-making (Chandros-Hull, Taylor, & Kass, 2001), and analyses of the character 
and consequences of narratives of health and illness (Lillrank, 2002; Williams, 2000). 
 
Conclusion 
Robertson (2001) observed that, in the human and social sciences, rather than the 
gradual accumulation of knowledge we most commonly have a succession of partially 
incommensurate mini-paradigms which arise as the dominance of one age cohort of 
scholars begins to fade and the next takes their place. In so doing they promote new 
approaches, seemingly at fundamental odds with the previous ones; consequently, instead 
of the progressive development of understanding we more often have its [p.92] 
generational churn and reconfiguration. Relatedly, Maines (2001) observes that scholars 
may magnify relatively small differences between their own arguments and those of 
previous generations in order to further their careers, but that this produces a kind of 
amnesia which has deleterious effects upon scholarship as a whole2. 
 
This problem is exacerbated - if not partially produced - by the fundamentally adversarial 
processes of academia which, in striving to ensuring quality, coincidentally encourage 
scholars to adopt comprehensively defensive stances. The frequently conflictual character 
of peer reviews and academic debates often mean that small differences get emphasised, 
commonalities minimised, and the distinctions between mini-paradigms powerfully 
imbued (in repeated experiences of having papers rejected, funding refused, conference 
talks critiqued, etc.) with feelings of humiliation, pride, anger, joy, anxiety and more. 
These feelings get configured to stabilise, amplify and multiply difference, to impede 
development and continuity, to meld institutional strictures into personal imperatives in 
ways that become difficult to later untangle. In an academic world thoroughly imbued by 
the competitive logic of the capitalist market, where promotions, careers and jobs 
themselves, depend upon citations, research funding and influence, these structures of 
feeling are both adaptive and predictable - but not always conducive to scholarship, 
which demands co-operation and reflection as well as contest and challenge. 
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Since it seems that the affective turn may represent one of these moments of change, we 
might sensibly heed Robertson’s implicit warning and strive to ensure that its potentials 
do not sabotage gains already made. In social science, Hemmings (2005) has already 
warned that the engagement with ontology upon which affect studies are premised may 
generate problems, whilst Papoulias & Callard (2010) raise concerns about borrowing 
from neuroscience. Within psychology, engagement with affect and feeling carries the 
danger, if mishandled, of a retreat to the individual, and of fostering naïve rather than 
critical reflexive humanisms (Parker, 1999). So there are pitfalls here, as well as potentials; 
the affective turn nevertheless offers exciting new possibilities for research and 
scholarship, with particular promise for qualitative research in health psychology. 
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